I. Introduction
Among the most notable, but least discussed, hallmarks of what I have called the "quiet revolution" in central banking practice (Blinder, 2004a) has been the movement toward making monetary policy decisions by committee. Until about a decade ago, most central banks had a single governor, who might or might not have been independent of the rest of the government. But since then, the United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil, to name just a few, have opted to establish monetary policy committees (MPCs) . In addition, the committee-based ECB replaced 12 central banks, most of which had previously been run by individual governors. I am unaware of any case in which a country replaced an MPC by a single decisionmaker. In fact, a recent survey by Pollard (2004) found that 79 out of 88 central banks made monetary policy by committee. Thus the existence of a pronounced worldwide trend is clear. So the first question for this paper is why. Why have so many central banks switched from individual to group decisionmaking?
But simply deciding that decisions should be made by committee does not provide a how-to-do-it manual for a central bank to follow. So the rest of the paper focuses on a few selected aspects of the "how" question. Should an MPC make decisions by majority rule, with each member voting for his or her preferred policy, as is the case at the Bank of England? Or is it better to insist on something approximating unanimity-whether the unanimity is genuine or contrived? And given this decision, how should the central bank communicate with the public, the government, and the markets?
II. The Presumed Advantages of Group Decisionmaking
Theorizing about why central banks might want to make decisions by committee is a relatively young intellectual industry-and still a small one. One of the reasons for the trend is institutional-and obvious. In a number of countries, the movement toward committees went hand-in-glove with the spread of central bank independence. When the central bank was just following orders communicated by the government, there was not much reason to have a committee on the other end of the phone. An individual governor sufficed-and also limited the phone bill. But as central bank independence was granted in one country after another, the choice between an individual and a committee became a live one-both in theory and in practice.
In this case, practice ran well ahead of theory. By the time economic theorists turned their attention to the question, many central banks had already made the switch from individual to group decisionmaking. We have thus witnessed a graphic illustration of the old saw: "It works in practice; now let's see if it also works in theory." Does it?
As soon as you start thinking about the choice between individuals and committees as a theoretical problem, one major stumbling block arises: If every member of an MPC behaves like homo economicus, it cannot matter whether monetary policy decisions are made by an individual or by a committee. Since every member of a committee of wellinformed homines economici will see the same data and process it in the same way, they will all reach the same conclusion. Every committee vote should therefore be unanimous, and the committee's decisions should be identical to what any single member, acting alone, would do.
1 That, of course, is not a promising starting point for developing a theory of the choice between individuals and committees. We had better look elsewhere. So, for example, the British chancellor embeds an implicit loss function within the Bank of England's policy remit when he instructs it to achieve 2% inflation within, say, two years. In principle, steering the economy then becomes a technocratic operation that can be carried out by a team of Keynesian dentists whose value judgments are irrelevant to their decisions. (After all, we don't generally wonder about our dentists' ideology.) But when the central bank's legal mandate is less precise, such as the Federal Reserve's 2 However, Morris and Shin (2002) argue that the existence of public information (such as central bank announcements) may influence the way private information affects markets.
vague instructions to pursue both "stable prices" and "maximum employment," committee members have much more scope for interpreting their mandate differently.
And they do. Thus disputes at the Fed and other central banks often pit hawks against doves-a fact that has not entirely escaped the attention of economic theorists.
In one of the earliest theoretical contributions, Christopher Waller (1992) Petra Gerlach-Kristen (forthcoming) took a step in this direction by supposing that the macroeconomic model of each MPC member differs in only one dimension: the estimate of potential output, y*, which is, of course, relevant to the outlook for inflation. Her answer to the question "Why use committees rather than individuals?" was both straightforward and reasonable. Each committee member receives a noisy signal of y*.
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By pooling these estimates, a committee can derive an estimate of y* that is more precise than any individual's. One clear implication of her model is that larger committees are better than smaller committees, which should give some comfort to the 19-member FOMC and the 18-member (so far!) ECB Governing Council. Less obviously, Gerlach-Kristen showed that committees will be less inertial than individuals in adjusting interest rates-a highly counterintuitive result for which there is some impressive recent experimental support (Blinder and Morgan, 2005 All this said, it must be admitted that committee decisionmaking also has its downsides-as a nice recent paper by Sibert (2005) points out. She notes, in particular, the danger of group-think, and the tendency of members of a group to "loaf" by freeriding on the efforts of others. I do not believe that loafing is a serious concern in the 7 An intermediate institutional arrangement might be a committee that is purely advisory to the central bank governor, as in New Zealand or Canada.
context of monetary policy, where the decisions are probably the most important things that committee members do-which stands in sharp contrast to many other committees on which all of us serve. But group-think is an ever-present danger that committee structures should be designed to avoid or minimize.
Is it a committee or an individual?
It should also be noted that the distinction between individual and group decisionmaking, while clean in theory, can be fuzzy in practice. Many central bank policy boards do not reach decisions by literal majority vote. 8 Committees have chairmen, who may dominate the proceedings. This fact is most obvious at the Fed, where it has often been believed-more or less correctly in recent years-that only one vote really matters.
On paper, the FOMC is a pure committee that reaches decisions by majority vote. In practice, each member other than Alan Greenspan has had only one real choice when the roll was called: whether to go on record as supporting or opposing the chairman's recommendation, would will prevail in any case. 9 It is therefore quite possible for the Fed to adopt one policy even though the (unweighted) majority favors another.
A particularly clear example came at the February 1994 meeting of the FOMC, when the Fed began a cycle of interest-rate increases by moving the Federal funds rate up 25 basis points. The transcript of that meeting shows that a clear majority of the committee favored raising the funds rate by 50 basis points. Greenspan, however, insisted not just on 25 basis points, but on a unanimous vote for that decision. He got both. Another example arose about two years later. As unemployment fell in the late 1990s, it was widely believed (and amply reported in the media) that the more-dovish chairman was holding back a more more-hawkish majority that wanted to raise rates.
This tradition of dominance by the chairman was probably as strong by 2005 as it ever was or will be, owing to Alan Greenspan's long tenure on the job, his evident success, and his august reputation. But the tradition did not originate with Greenspan. Paul
Volcker's dominance was also legendary. And a fascinating empirical study of FOMC decisions under the chairmanship of Arthur Burns found that Burns's opinion counted roughly as much as all the rest of the committee members put together. 10 However, the authors did reject the hypothesis that Burns, in essence, decided policy unilaterally.
Empirically, the opinions of other FOMC members had some explanatory power for the committee's decisions.
Do committees make better decisions?
A priori reasoning is nice, but do monetary policy committees actually outperform individual decisionmakers in practice? This question is extremely difficult to answer econometrically. To begin with, it may not be easy to tell whether a given central bank uses group or individual decisionmaking. The Greenspan Fed was a good example, as just mentioned. Furthermore, the criteria that distinguish between "better" and "worse" Thus by merging the two sets of experimental data, we will be able to appraise the relative performances of committees of three different sizes. Second, we are looking into whether committees do better when they have a clear leader (representing the central bank chairman, governor, or president). In our original experimental setup, all members of the committee were equal.
Are committees more transparent?
Apart from achieving better macroeconomic outcomes, it is sometimes argued that group decisionmaking has another important advantage over individual decisionmaking:
11 Lombardelli et al (2005) subsequently replicated our findings (qualitatively).
It is inherently more transparent. After all, it is hard to get inside a person's head. Since Thus the conclusion seems to be twofold. In principle, a single central bank governor can be extremely transparent if he chooses to be (or if the law directs him to be), and a committee can be opaque. In practice, there are real-world cases of both. 
III. A Typology of Monetary Policy Committees
Up to now, I have spoken of a "monetary policy committee" as if that term connotes a specific, well-defined organizational structure. In fact, it does not; committees come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. In Blinder et al. (2001) The internal proceedings of an individualistic MPC may be quite messy because the group process thrives on differences of opinion. It therefore must welcome internal disagreements and learn to manage them. Indeed, the potential strength of such a committee lies precisely in weighing the different views and methods of analysis that its members bring to bear on an issue-and in the consequent resistance to group-think. The individualistic structure also builds in strong safeguards against capture by an idiosyncratic theory, methodology, or ideology-which is redolent of Waller's (1992) model in which policymaking by majority vote moderates partisanship. That analysis points strongly toward individualistic committees in which each member votes for his or her preferred monetary policy.
Of course, such a freewheeling group may sometimes find it difficult to agree on what to do. For example, the Bank of England's MPC reaches decisions by narrow 5-4 votes about ten percent of the time. Alternatively, a highly individualistic committee may manage to reach a decision, but then find it difficult to agree on the analysis and reasoning behind it. In the latter case, the committee has a communication problem on its hands. For example, the admirably transparent British MPC used to find it so difficult to agree on a post-meeting statement explaining its decision that it did not even issue one. Collegial committees: By contrast, members of a collegial committee agree in advance that their individual differences of opinion must be subordinated to the common good, lest the authority of the group be undermined. Such a committee arrives at a group decision that somehow springs from the collective wisdom of the group as a whole and is embraced by all of its members. There may or may not be a formal vote at each MPC meeting. But if there is one, it is expected to be-and normally is-unanimous or nearly so. A dissenting vote is likely to be seen as noteworthy, as is the case on the FOMC 14 However, the MPC did (and still does) make its reasoning clear in the minutes, which have followed less than two weeks after each meeting. today.
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A collegial committee can reach agreement in a variety of ways. I limit myself to two polar cases. On what I call a genuinely-collegial committee, members may argue strenuously for their own points of view behind closed doors. But they ultimately compromise on a group decision, and then each member takes ownership of that decision.
There may or may not be a formal vote; but regardless, there are no (or negligible) public disagreements. The ECB's Governing Council appears to function as such a committee.
In what I call an autocratically-collegial committee, by contrast, the chairman more or less dictates the group "consensus." He may begin the meeting with the decision already made and simply inform the other members. Or he may listen to the debate and then announce the group's consensus, expecting everyone else to fall in line. But in either case, the group's decision is essentially the chairman's decision, hopefully informed by, and perhaps even influenced by, the views of other committee members. The Federal Open Market Committee under Alan Greenspan was such a committee, although Greenspan was always a gentle autocrat who persuaded and cajoled rather than browbeat other members.
In the best cases, the internal proceedings of a genuinely-collegial committee may resemble those of an individualistic committee, including a vigorous but confidential internal debate. By contrast, the decisionmaking process of an autocratically-collegial committee may be more like that of a single decisionmaker-in substance, if not in form.
FOMC meetings, for example, have been highly formal and polite affairs, very much controlled by the chairman. Although alternative views were aired, no one would realistically call what went on "debates." In both sorts of collegial committees, the danger of group-think is real When it comes to policymaking, however, the leader of even an autocraticallycollegial committee is still not in quite as dominant a position as an individual central bank governor-precisely because of the aforementioned tradition of collegiality. The collegiality rubber hits the policy road in at least two places. First, the chairman knows that, if push ever comes to shove, rebellion is always possible if he tries to steamroll his committee into doing something it finds repugnant. As a formal matter, he lacks the de jure authority to force his committee members to accept his position. The strong desire for de facto consensus therefore empowers the rest of the committee to serve as a kind of check on the chairman, who cannot easily pursue extreme policies, follow highly idiosyncratic procedures, or base policy on controversial theories that the rest of the committee does not accept. 16 Second, the desire to maintain the appearance of unity will sometimes force even a dominant chairman to tack in either the hawkish or dovish direction in order to keep wavering committee members on board. Alan Greenspan has been about as dominant a chairman as you are ever likely to see. Yet even he occasionally modified his position slightly (I emphasize the word slightly) in order to minimize dissent. He might do so by wording the statement in a way that would placate some potential dissenters. Or he might do so by offering the so-called "bias" as a consolation prize to the losing side. (He sometimes even allowed the committee a free vote on the bias.) Or he might do so by shading his policy recommendation just enough to pick up a wavering voter or two.
(Example: by moving the interest rate 25 basis points at the meeting instead of 50, with a presumption that there will be another 25 basis points between meetings.) But whatever his chosen method, Greenspan led the FOMC with a velvet glove, not with an iron fist.
When things are functioning smoothly, the communications that emanate from the two types of collegial committees may sound alike-and they may be quite similar to what you would hear from a single decisionmaker. In particular, a collegial committee should be able to speak with one voice most of the time. Naturally, that will be easier for an autocratically-collegial committee, where the chairman is the obvious spokesman, than for a genuinely-collegial committee, where each member may feel entitled to express his or her nuance of difference. But even a nearly-dictatorial chairman may find disaffected members "sounding off" in public, if they feel that their views did not receive a fair hearing at the meeting. This has been known to cause problems for the FOMC on occasion.
Thus ranked in terms of proximity to the classic decisionmaker of economic theory, 
IV. Committee Structure and Communication Policy
Having mentioned transparency and discussed the various types of monetary policy committee, I now want to bring these two strands of thought together in order to make an important, but oft-ignored, point: that the appropriate volume and style of central bank communication depend sensitively on the type of decisionmaker.
The major items that any central bank might think about disclosing or keeping secret are:
The monetary policy decision. It may seem ridiculous even to put this item on the list, but until February 1994 the FOMC did not publicly disclose its interest-rate decisions. Now, however, I believe this basic aspect of transparency is entirely non-controversial, and so I will not mention it further.
The statement that accompanies the decision and, presumably, explains it. What should or should not be said in these statements is a matter of continuing controversy, and practices differ enormously across central banks.
The vote. Voting, of course, is relevant only when a committee makes the decision. MPCs around the world vary greatly in whether they take an explicit vote on the interest rate decision, whether they announce the results of the vote, whether the announcement is made promptly or with a long delay, and whether, in doing so, they name names. The choices for a committee are both more numerous and more subtle. Remember that a collegial committee wants to project an aura of agreement in its communications. If doing so masks disagreements within the committee, that in itself might be deemed to constitute a certain lack of transparency. But I view that particular bit of nontransparency as quite permissible as long as (a) the committee has decided to make decisions collegially, and (b) the group's reasoning is clearly explained. Where there are disagreements, a truly transparent MPC can, and probably should, present dissenting views (e.g., those that failed to win the internal argument) as arguments that the committee considered but rejected. Doing so would help the market to think more like (the majority of) the central bank committee. The situation is different on an individualistic committee, however, where differences of opinion are an essential part of the information that needs to be conveyed to the markets. So let us consider each type of disclosure separately.
Important inputs to and reasons for the decision
The statement and the minutes: I group these two types of communication together because there is a tradeoff between providing information in the immediate statement versus in the subsequent minutes. Committees have a choice, as if the "production function" for transparency had two inputs that are strong substitutes: information in the statement, and information in the minutes. If the statement is very terse and/or cryptic, much of the burden of explanation falls on the minutes, which must therefore convey a great deal of information-which is the FOMC's practice. But if the immediate statement is sufficiently clear and detailed, no one but historians will be much interested in the minutes, which become available only weeks or months later, if ever. This may approximate the model of the ECB, which issues no minutes but whose president holds press conferences directly after meetings.
The three types of committee can and, in my judgment, should choose different "optimal" points along the imaginary production-indifference curve for information. A genuinely-collegial committee, having just argued things out, may find it difficult to agree on a detailed statement in real time. So it may prefer to limit itself to a terse statement, with fuller explanations provided later in the minutes. 18 The problem of producing an immediate statement is even more acute for an individualistic committee, which (unlike a collegial committee) may not even have carried the argument through to a consensus.
Such a committee may find it difficult to produce any real-time statement at all (as used to be the case at the Bank of England). An autocratically-collegial committee, however, should find it much easier to prepare a detailed statement to be issued at the end of the meeting. Indeed, the chairman may walk into the meeting room with a draft of the statement in his pocket, as Alan Greenspan did for yeares at the FOMC. 19 Since sooner is better than later where market-sensitive information is concerned, such a committee should rely more on the statement and less on the minutes. Thus, for example, I believe that the FOMC should issue much fuller statements than it does at present.
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The vote: As previously mentioned, the vote on monetary policy is an essential piece of forward-looking information when decisions are made by an individualistic committee.
Therefore, such a committee should always announce its vote promptly, probably naming names. I say this for two reasons. First, members of an individualistic committee have individual accountability, not just group accountability. So the public and its political representatives have a right to know the views of each committee member. Second, naming names and acquiring some understand of the group dynamics should improve market participants' abilities to forecast the committee's future decisions.
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The case for announcing votes and names is more equivocal on collegial committees.
Obviously, if there are any dissenting votes, announcing them will impair the committee's ability to project the aura of consensus that it desires. If doing so is considered important, as it is for example at the ECB, there may be a case for keeping the 19 Toward the end of Greenspan's chairmanship, candidate drafts of the statement were vetted by FOMC members prior to the meeting. In earlier years, only Greenspan saw these statements prior to the meeting. 20 But the trend is clearly in the right direction. FOMC statements are both more frequent and more informative now than they were a decade ago, when they were rare and typically asserted that the purpose of the rate change was to "sustain non-inflationary growth" regardless of whether the funds rate was raised or lowered. 21 For some evidence that this is the case for the Bank of England, see Gerlach-Kristen (2003) .
vote secret-or even for not having a vote.
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Perhaps more important, the formal vote may be a poor indicator of the actual amount of disagreement on a collegial MPC, one that prizes-or, in the limit, forces-consensus.
According to longstanding FOMC tradition, for example, a member is expected to vote in favor of the chairman's policy proposal unless he or she disagrees with it fundamentally-which is a much sterner test than merely preferring an alternative. 23 So a unanimous FOMC vote does not necessarily indicate 100% agreement, and the markets know that. More generally, the number of dissenting votes clearly underestimates the amount of disagreement. Still, some information, even if imperfect, is better than no information. So, on balance, I am inclined to believe that even collegial committees should normally take a vote and make the result public.
Inputs to the decision:
When it comes to discussing the considerations that enter into monetary policy decisions, an MPC is in a position that is more similar to than different from that of an individual decisionmaker. Both, I believe, should reveal quite a lot more than most central banks do at present about their internal forecasts, the models they use to appraise policy effects and/or to generate forecasts, and so on. Frankly, I have long been baffled by why some central banks, including the Federal Reserve, treat their internal forecasts like state secrets when revealing them would not only help the central bank explain its decisions better, but would probably also get the financial markets thinking more like the central bank. So I believe that nearly-complete disclosure in this domain is 22 As a supranational institution, the ECB has a special reason for suppressing voting: It might highlight disagreements among nations. That, however, is a step away from transparency. 23 For a fascinating attempt to model this behavior, see Chappell et al. (2005) , especially Chapters 4 and 6. As noted above in footnote 15, the rate of dissent on the FOMC over the past five years has been barely above 1%. We can be sure that the rate of mere disagreement was higher. The minutes, for example, make this clear.
probably the preferred policy, 24 and there does not seem to be much difference across types of decisionmaking bodies.
One frequently-raised objection is that an MPC composed of n members may have n different forecasts. Should it reveal them all? I am tempted to answer yes, but that may be neither practical for the central bank nor useful to the markets. Failing that, I would recommend that central banks release their staff forecasts as frequently as they are made.
Markets will quickly learn (provided they are told) that these staff forecasts are not necessarily accepted by all members of the MPC. Alternatively, if the MPC itself takes the time and effort to reach a consensus on its forecast, then that forecast should be revealed instead, for it will embody uniquely some of the key assumptions and debate behind the decision. If there is useful information about the uncertainty that surrounds the forecast (e.g., as in the Bank of England's fan charts), then that should probably be released, too.
Finally, Table 1 indicates that revealing its (conditional) forecasts of its own behavior is quite possible for a central bank with an individual decisionmaker, rather more difficult-but perhaps still possible--for an autocratically-collegial MPC, and probably out of the question for the other two types. I suggest that a genuinely-collegial MPC may have to content itself with a statement of its "bias" or "balance of risks," while a truly That said, the talk that emanates from the Bank of England's MPC certainly comes from many voices, and yet does seem to inform markets much more than it confuses them-although it took a while for markets to get used to all the chatter. Similarly, the Swedish Riksbank's individualistic MPC seems to have coped with its potential cacophony problem pretty well. So I view the problem of multiple voices from an individualistic MPC as manageable. It requires some thought, and perhaps a bit of coordination; but it certainly does not justify any serious retreat from transparency.
The single-versus multiple-voice issue is more complicated for collegial committees.
If a collegial MPC is highly autocratic, it would seem easy to get by with a single spokesperson (the chairman) without sacrificing much in the way of transparency. After all, the committee's views are, in essence, the chairman's views. But suppose the autocratic nature of the decisionmaking process suppresses dissenting votes, giving a superficial (but false) appearance of unanimity. In that case, disparate talk may be the only way for markets to learn about disagreements within the committee. 25 And if there are dissenting votes, the dissenters ought to explain their reasons for disagreeing with the chairman. So perhaps multiple voices are appropriate for even an autocratically-collegial committee. But, unlike the case of an individualistic committee, markets need to understand that, when it comes to forecasting the committee's likely future actions, only one voice really counts: the chairman's. The others merely convey information on the strength or weakness of the consensus supporting him.
Ironically, it seems to be the genuinely-collegial committee that may sacrifice the least in terms of lost transparency by speaking with one voice. If a true consensus has been reached, the chairman will presumably convey that consensus to the public faithfully, rather than express his personal views if they differ from those of the group. If other members also talk, they will presumably adhere to "the party line"-a line to which they have all agreed. Thus we seem to have the following non-monotonic ranking of the appropriate number of public voices on a monetary policy committee:
Individualistic MPC: definitely requires multiple voices
Autocratically-collegial MPC: may benefit from multiple voices. Similarly, putting all the national eggs in the Greenspan basket served the United
States extremely well. But that was not so obvious when he was first appointed in 1987.
And in the 1970s, we put all our eggs in the Arthur Burns basket, with rather less favorable results. The point is that picking an individual central bank head is a bit like investing your entire portfolio in a single stock. There is simply no guarantee that the nation will always, or even normally, hit the jackpot. Hence I am drawn back to the same simple principle: It pays to diversify your central bank portfolio.
There is also a parallel political argument. Forgive me for saying so, but benign dictatorship is the most effective way to govern a large organization. It is certainly far more efficient than a messy, slow-moving, and highly political democracy, for example.
Thus well-run universities are almost always organized as benign dictatorships. I shudder to think about how they would operate as true democracies. Fortunately, however, few political philosophers have seen fit to apply this "lesson" to the governance of nationstates, and for a very good reason: It is highly risky to rely on the kindness of dictators, who have a way of not remaining benign.
You may have noticed that, as I proceeded through the catalogue of reasons to prefer a monetary policy committee to a single individual, most of the reasons also pointed to an individualistic committee structure, rather than to a collegial one. Except for one. A monetary policy committee that is too egalitarian runs the aforementioned danger of speaking with too many voices. If the result is a cacophony rather than clarity, that may confuse rather than enlighten the markets and the public-thereby turning transparency into noise. And that, in turn, can hamper the operation of monetary policy.
Furthermore, the citizens of a democracy have a right to understand what their central bank is up to, and why. A bank that is incapable of explaining why it does what it does is failing to perform one vital aspect of its duty. Someone, presumably the chairman, must therefore speak definitively for the committee, or else somehow ensure that all the committee members sing from the same page. In that limited sense, too much democracy inside the central bank could be a mixed blessing.
There should, in principle, be a kind of "interior maximum" where a monetary policy committee is individualistic enough to reap the benefits of diversity and yet collegial and disciplined enough to project a clear and transparent message. Such a committee might look fractious and argumentative from the inside, but united and like-minded from the outside. That is an elusive goal, to be sure, but it is one worth pursuing. And I believe it will take place us somewhere between the stereotypes of an individualistic committee and a genuinely-collegial committee (albeit one with a clear leader)-probably closer to the former.
VI. Conclusions
The main points of this paper can be summarized easily.
• When it comes to making complex decisions, committees have several presumed advantages over individuals, including a larger and more diverse knowledge base, different decision heuristics, and a built-in system of checks and balances.
• Committees can reach decisions either individualistically (i.e., through voting) or collegially. In the latter case, the group decisionmaking process can be either autocratically or genuinely collegial.
• Committees are neither inherently more nor less transparent than individuals.
• Most of the presumed advantages of group (versus individual) decisionmaking point to the superiority of genuinely-collegial or individualistic committees.
• One potential disadvantage of an individualistic committee, however, is that it may confuse outside observers by speaking with too many voices.
• The best ways of communicating with markets and the general public differ between individual central bank governors acting alone and formal monetary policy committees, and across different types of committees. When it comes to transparency, one size does not fit all.
